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Abstract A foresight hub within the Directorate General
Research and Innovation (DG RTD) of the European Com-
mission will support the decision-making procedures of the
EU Horizon 2020 research, technology, and innovation pro-
gramme. Foresight in particular is seen as an instrument
defining research priorities for European society’s needs in
support of the ‘grand societal challenges’.
The new initiative marks the recent success of the institu-
tional and administrative application of foresight and derives
from a long history of approaches to foresight taken by the
European Commission. In fact, the Commission has been
implementing measures to both internalise and externalise
foresight during various periods since the 1970s. This paper
outlines the various phases and approaches of foresight at the
European Commission. It contextualises the new attempt of
the foresight hub that is assumed to support the next European
Commission’s research and innovation policies.
Keywords European Commission . Horizon 2020 .
Administrative foresight . Good governance
Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath could have trig-
gered the acceptance and the re-appearance of foresight in the
EU’s policy toolbox. Thus, instruments are needed to detect
early crisis phenomena and to identify sustainable ways to
overcome these.
Over time in DG Research and Innovation, foresight has
taken different forms in terms of approach, methodology and
operation. Originally more of an academic activity, it has
developed as an instrument for policy-making. However,
foresight has been informative in nature, focusing on influenc-
ing policy thinking rather than policy making.1 Today, fore-
sight is accepted as a knowledge tool for decision-making on
R&I priorities.
The article will explain firstly the approach of foresight in
the context of good governance. Secondly it will outline the
new institutional and administrative approach of foresight in
the Commission. Thirdly it will look retrospectively at earlier
approaches and phases of foresight in the European Commis-
sion. Then the article will describe the framework of the
‘grand societal challenges’ relevant for the operation of the
foresight hub before eventually concluding its reasoning.
Foresight and good governance
As latterly understood, foresight feeds not only into thinking
about and debating the future but also into shaping the future
by means of a structured process. Historically, it has devel-
oped from pure technological and economic forecasting to a
policy instrument involving stakeholder participation. The
1 Rand Cooperation: Using foresight to improve the science-policy rela-
tionship, Luxembourg 2006.
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same has been observed outside the Commission. Foresight is
an enlightened approach to policy-making.
In one sense, the Commission’s mainstreaming of foresight
is a response to the challenge of improving its administration
and governance,2 as outlined in itsWhite Paper on European
Governance.3 This paper sought to involve more people and
organisations in policy-making and called for more openness,
accountability and responsibility. In view of the diversity of
national institutions, the Commission announced that it
favoured policies based on framework directives and co-
regulation in view of the diversity of national institutions. This
was to ensure smoother implementation instead of insisting on
more directives and other legislation. Consequently, the Com-
mission moved to the ‘open method of coordination’, which is
a ‘soft power’ approach to governance steered and coordinat-
ed by the Commission itself.
When it comes to new initiatives in the field of economic
and social matters, the Commission seeks to lead the Europe-
an policy agenda. This is achieved through documents setting
out comparative information, results of Europe-wide consul-
tations with stakeholders in the field, and options for action
plans. The Member States then tend to reflect these policy
agendas in their own national policies. The Commission has
initiated Europe-wide debate on many policy issues.4 This
debate-based approach to policy leads to new forms of coop-
eration between Member States and the Commission rather
than directives and executive decisions.
The Commission works on consensus-building in inter-
institutional fora, as well as with Member State representa-
tives in committees and through inter-governmental coopera-
tion in order to implement policies. One example of this
approach is the ‘open method of coordination’, rather than
using legislative power for policy implementation. This is a
specific form of cooperation between Member States and the
Commission based on various types of benchmarking. Under
the European Semester,5 the Commission issues recommen-
dations and carries out monitoring. Member States are
required to report on progress and implement the guidelines
at national level according to their particular circumstances.
This open but informed method/process is essential
where governance is seen as involving a broad range
of stakeholders and experts in policy-making. This has
become a feature of European politics and the EU’s
approach to governance.
Foresight is able to significantly contribute to these pecu-
liarly European methods of governance. Foresight procedures
can help tackle innovation obstacles by mobilising a range of
societal and economic stakeholders to overcome problems
caused by the ‘grand societal challenges’. This is through
the Innovation Union initiative6 and the development of tech-
nology platforms. In that spirit, foresight contributes to the
‘soft power’ approach to governance. Consequently, it can
contribute to good governance practices, such as information,
consultation, consensus-building and enlightening policy-
making.
The new institutional and administrative approach
of foresight
Since 2014, foresight activities have been integral to the
Commission’s priority-setting in research and innovation
(R&I) policy and action. They will shape the preparation of
work programmes for upcoming R&I programmes under
Horizon 2020.7
As an integral part of the Commission’s administrative
culture, foresight is expected to be used as follows:
& to support the Horizon 2020 strategic programme;
& to improve interaction with stakeholders by:
& helping to develop a ‘foresight’ community in the EU;
& linking foresight in Member States;
& systematically integrating advisory structures into the Ho-
rizon 2020;
& creating an internal community.
After a long process of learning from various foresight
activities,8 the recent foresight developments have been
reintroduced to DG RTD. This time, it comes in the form of
2 Governance is to be understood as rules, processes and behaviour that
affect how power is exercised. Good governance involves transparent
administrative processes and policy objectives, efficient spending, value
for money and stakeholder consultation.
3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:52001DC0428&rid=2
4 Such as the notion of competitiveness, factors that foster or hinder it,
benchmarking, economic framework conditions, sustainability and best
available technologies, the information and knowledge society, evalua-
tion, the reform of higher education and, of course, the ‘grand societal
challenges’. For details see: http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/
horizon2020/en/news/grand-challenge-design-and-societal-impact-
horizon-2020
5 The ‘European Semester’ is the EU’s cycle of economic and fiscal
policy coordination. It focuses on the first half of each year (the ‘semes-
ter’). Member States align their budgetary and economic policies with
objectives and rules agreed at EU level; see: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/special-reports/european-semester
6 The Innovation Union, one of seven flagship initiatives to implement
the Europe 2020 Strategy, aims to ensure that new knowledge-intensive
products and services contribute substantially to growth and jobs. It is a
strategic and comprehensive concept to innovation in a broad sense and
as a greater political goal; see: http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-
union/index_en.cfm or http://era.gv.at/directory/135
7 http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/
8 Building foresight capacities in European academic research or using
internal advisory capacity.
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administrative mainstreaming, whereby a systematic foresight
procedure will influence decision-making on the Horizon
2020 work programme.
The European Forum on Forward Looking Activities
(EFFLA), which consisted of high level expert group of 15
dedicated Members,9 was set up to ensure genuinely
evidence-based and forward-looking policy-making. EFFLA
drew up a specially tailored process for the Commission. This
was due to enter into force in 2014.
Diagram: Suggested modus operandi of the envisaged
Foresight Hub. This Modus Operandi has been inspired by a
system used by Tekes, Finland.
This foresight process is made up of four parts: Part I –
Strategic intelligence, Part II – Sense-making, Part III – Selecting
priorities, and Part IV – Implementation (see diagram).
Parts I and II introduce a challenge to the Commission, as
they take on board input from a wide range of sources,
including Member States. In addition it takes account of any
influences to be as inclusive and open as possible.
‘Strategic intelligence’ in a broad and comprehensive
manner has until now been missing from the process of the
Commission’s activities and hence requires more attention.
This step involves a systemic process of collecting, analysing
and making sense of all strategic intelligence to gather evi-
dence, future perspectives and options needed to make en-
lightened decisions on priorities and implementation.
The phase of ‘sense-making’ intends to reveal gaps in the
input collected of the strategic intelligence. It challenges the
results of intelligence reports by exploring alternatives.
‘Sense-making’ was part of the Commission’s process before
EFFLAmade its recommendation, but it was a relatively weak
and isolated activity. This is still the case in some Member
States. The revised Sense-making is more robust and inclusive
and considers in particular:
& analysing drivers;
& ensuring vision-building;
& creating alternative scenarios.
‘Selecting priorities’ and ‘implementation’ are the last
two steps of the foresight process, and are closely linked. They
are already well-established at EU and Member State levels.
They can be significantly enriched through reinforced strate-
gic intelligence and sense-making processes. These will pro-
vide much stronger, genuinely evidence-based analyses of
issues and options, and assessments of expected impacts.
It is important to make a clear distinction between formal
and informal steps. ‘Strategic intelligence’ and ‘sense-mak-
ing’ are predominantly informal processes of research. How-
ever ‘selecting priorities’ and ‘implementation’ are formal
processes inside the institutions whereby ‘intelligent’ stake-
holders can lend support although formal stakeholders remain
in charge.10
9 Prof. Peter Piot, Mr. Dan Andree, Prof. João Caraca, Prof. Luke
Georghiou, Dr. Philippe Kourilsky, Dr. Riikka Heikinheimo, Dr. Gill
Ringland, Prof. Michal Kleiber, Prof. Athena Linos, Dr. Horst Soboll,
Dr. Matthias Weber, Dr. Kerstin Cuhls, Dr. Anne Stenros, Prof. Adrian
Curaj, Ms. Anna Tschaut. 10 Ibid.
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Institutionalising foresight in the Commission requires the
creation of a foresight ‘hub’ through which officials co-
ordinate their foresight efforts, including cooperation with
the Member States. Important steps have already been taken
to set up this ‘hub’ and it is likely to be operational in the near
future. This hub will help advisory groups in their discussions
on priorities and directions based on foresight evidence.
Ensuring the quality and integration of ‘strategic intelligence’
and ‘sense-making’ will make for better decision-making and
more appropriate implementation and monitoring.11
The rocky way of foresight in the Commission
After having outlined the current initiative we will describe in
more detail the long-lasting history of foresight inside the Euro-
pean Commission which serves as a background for the current
initiative. In the following chapter we will outline the application
of foresight within the Commission over time. Its progression to
being used as an administrative instrument is characterised by a
series of overlapping phases of different forms of application.We
may assign these phases to time periods, although these periods
only can indicate the most relevant developments.
Over time, foresight has been supported or applied by the
Commission in different ways. The Commission has used
foresight as an internal advisory capacity by establishing ded-
icated intelligence units in the institution as the strongest form
of foresight application in support of policy decision making.
Another approach was funding independent foresight by re-
search grants. In addition, exploratory studies and reports have
been commissioned in order to exploit particular results in the
interest of the Commission. Another approach was supporting
the foresight community in the Member States, co-operating
with external institutions and co-ordinating issues in common
interest. The phases of interest and of activities undertaken by
the European Commission can thus be described as a rise and
fall and a rise again of Commission owned foresight.
Exploratory studies and reports (1979–94)
Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf made what was probably the
first attempt at foresight in the Commission in the late 1970s
by ordering an internal report, Europe plus 30 (1978). In the
end, he did not use the study, as he left the Commission early
to teach at the London School of Economics where he even-
tually became dean.
Nonetheless, Europe plus 30 gave birth to the FAST
programme,12 run by the Commission’s research department
at the time, DG XXII. Set up to provide DG XXII with policy
advice, FAST was headed from 1979 to 1994 by R. Petrella,
during which time it was extended twice.13 FAST’s mandate and
projects had more the flavour of a foresight programme than a
science and technology assessment activity. It sought to explore
new avenues for research policy and had a strong public profile
due to a broad range of publications distributed worldwide.
In the early days of European foresight, there was a request
from several parliamentary institutions in the Member States
for technology assessment approaches. Consequently, the Eu-
ropean Parliament also came up with an initiative in 1987. This
was called the Science and Technology Options Assessment
(STOA) programme, and was started up by Rolf LinkohrMEP.
Under his guidance, STOA grew from a two-year pilot project
to an integral part of the European Parliament secretariat’s
work. In the latest legislature, the chair of STOAwas António
Correia de Campos, the two vice-chairs were Paul Rübig and
Malcolm Harbour; the vice-president of the European Parlia-
ment responsible for STOAwas Oldřich Vlasák.
The role of STOA is to provide an individual MEP and/or
group of MEPs with expert independent assessments of the
impact of technology options in the policy sectors that concern
the Parliament. These, in particular regard cross-disciplinary
and strategic issues.
In 1989, the Commission established a Forward Studies
Unit, a small ‘think tank’ staffedwith EU officials and reporting
directly to the President, Jacques Delors. This was run along
traditional French lines as a cellule de prospective. It was
attached to the President’s private office and produced a series
of forward-looking reflections on policies of a general nature.
They are not restricted to science and technology developments
and included for example scenarios for Russia or East Asia.
Delors’ successor, Romano Prodi, converted the cellule into a
‘policy advisory group’ without foresight activities.
Outsourcing foresight to specific institutions (1993–2003)
When the FAST programme came to an end, the gap was
filled by several activities at European level:
– The Institute for Prospective Technological Studies
(IPTS) was established in Seville (Spain) in the mid-90s
as a part of the Joint Research Centre (JRC).14 Its first
head was the former director of the Commission’s MON-




12 FAST – ‘forecasting and assessment in science and technology’.
13 The last phase was renewed as a sub-programme under theMONITOR
programme. See Eurofutures — The Challenge of Innovation
(Butterworth & Co Publishers Ltd., London 1986) for the results of FAST
I. Also, The FASTII Programme (1984–87) – European Futures, pros-
pects and issues in science and technology, summaries of research pro-
jects, European Commission, Official Journal (1987).
14 JRC is a ‘sister’ DG to DG RTD.
15 FAST was part of the MONITOR structure after previously coming
under the SAST (technology assessment) programme and prior to being
included in the SPEAR (evaluation and research) programme.
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was to inform the Commission on new science and tech-
nology developments and to carry out its own research.16
It ran several successful foresight projects, e.g. on ‘futures’
and ‘ambient intelligence’.17
– TheEuropeanTechnologyAssessmentNetwork (ETAN)
was a pilot action for policy-related research. ETAN came
from the Targeted Socio-Economic Research (TSER) pro-
gramme developed under the Fourth Framework Pro-
gramme for research and technological development.
– The Science and Technology Policy Options (STRA
TA) programme was continued in the Fifth Framework
Programme. Activities involved analysis and synthesis on
specific issues related to science and technology policies.
The programme funded external research rather than
supporting a specific analytical unit within the Commis-
sion. This was intended to support strategic thinking at
academic and national level which would also be of
benefit to the Commission to the extent that it could
communicate with outside experts.
Return to DG RTD and cooperation with national foresight
institutions (2001–2006)
At their March 2000 meeting in Lisbon, the EU’s Heads of
State and Government agreed on a vision for economic and
social development in Europe as a new policy approach. The
intention was for the EU to become ‘the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and
greater social cohesion’ by 2010.
The Lisbon Strategy18 produced a benchmark for innovation
and research in the EU. Europe was perceived as lagging behind
its competitors in various areas of science and technology and
R&I policywas seen as a key instrument for remedying this fact.
Two years later in Barcelona, the European Council called for
increased investment in research to close the gap with Europe’s
main competitors. Investment was to rise from 1.9 to 3 % of
GDP in the EU by 2010, and the proportion funded by business
was to rise to two-thirds of the total. Since then, relevant
stakeholders have agreed to act on the lines suggested.19
Previously and in the same context in the year 2000, the
Commission had suggested the development of a European
Research Area (ERA).20 This was to be a key area for action,
identify excellence, strengthen Europe-wide collaboration and
establish clearer, more consistent priorities for public research.
This would also give European excellence a higher profile in
science and research among researchers in other parts of the
world.
These political developments formed the basis of the deci-
sion to create an in-house foresight unit in the Directorate-
General for Research. The idea was to strengthen the founda-
tions of the ERA and ensure consistency in R&I policies.
Work to develop a strong, integrated R&I area in Europe
needed to be guided by a vision on potential growth areas
and future perspectives. Forecasting, technology assessment,
future studies and other forms of foresight were carried out to
identify long term trends and guide decision-making. Fore-
sight was recognised as having the potential to improve R&I
policies and to strengthen the strategic dimension of the ERA.
Over time, many initiatives, activities and institutions had
been implemented in the Member States. The Commission
preferred to build a platform for exchange to encourage net-
working and cooperation at European level.
A range of national foresight activities were being conduct-
ed across Europe in this period21:
& The UK had the first comprehensive national programme.
The first round of this programme took place between
1994 and 1999, covered 15 industry-sector expert panels.
The second round ran from 1999 to 2002 and the third
round ran from 2002 to 200522;
& In France, a wide-ranging exercise for the Ministry of
Industry focused on ‘key technologies’. In 2003, the Na-
tional Association for Technical Research (ANRT)
launched and coordinated the FUTURIS project, which
aimed to stimulate a broad dialogue across society;
& In Germany, the Ministry of Education and Research ran
the FUTUR programme. This was an exercise based on
new stakeholder participation and aimed at identifying
new priorities for science and technology.
The foresight activities provided information through its
monitoring andmapping around the world. Results weremade
available to European foresight actors,23 supporting








21 A number of other programmes and activities existed inMember States
like Denmark, Sweden, Finland, at regional level like in Baden-
Wurttemberg and Flanders, or outside the Commission like in Korea or
at the UNIDO. See: Foresighting Europe Newsletter, http://ec.europa.eu/
research/foresight/10/article_3962_en.htm
22 Projects concerned: cognitive systems; flood and coastal defence; cyber
trust and crime prevention; and exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum.
23 The European Foresight Monitoring Network (EFMN) project consti-
tuted the first element of the European Science and Technology Foresight
Knowledge Sharing Platform: it consisted of monitoring Foresight activ-
ities relevant to European decision-makers at various levels in the field of
research and innovation policy. Moreover, it disseminated the related
information by policy briefs to the Foresight community as well as
policy-makers.
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methodological developments, and mutual learning was sup-
ported in the FOR-Learn project.
New institutional preparation (2007–2013)
Foresight activities had no place inside the Commission after
2005. However, support for foresight as an external academic
or research activity got funding through the new FP7 pro-
gramme. This was to build up foresight research capacity in
Europe. Despite the above developments, foresight was not
taken on board again in the EU until the deep financial crisis
that unfolded from 2008.
On 3 March 2010, the Commission proposed a new 10-
year strategy, Europe 2020,24 to follow on from the Lisbon
Strategy agreed in the year 2000. Seeking to boost the EU
economy, the new Europe 2020 strategy aimed at ‘smart,
sustainable, inclusive growth’, with more ‘joined-up’ national
and European policies. Of the Europe 2020 strategy's seven
flagship initiatives, it is the Innovation Union initiative25 that
mostly concerns research and innovation, and which aims to
strengthen innovation throughout the Union.
Of the commitments on which the Innovation Union is
based, the eighth commitment is most relevant to the area of
foresight. It stipulated the creation of a European Forum on
Forward-Looking Activities (EFFLA) to bring together
existing studies and data. It was to involve public and private
stakeholders so as to enhance collective intelligence and help
develop better long-term European policies.
EFFLAwas set up in 2011 and charged with:
& aggregating the results of outstanding forward-looking
activities supported by European or other programmes;
& offering advice on how to use these results for the early
identification/understanding of existing/emerging ‘grand
societal challenges’ that could have a significant impact in
Europe;
& providing advice and evidence on how these trends could
affect European R&I systems and linking the changes to
political processes.
EFFLA’s achievements were to ‘institutionalise’ foresight
by mainstreaming it in strategic programming. As a result,
foresight is now an integral part of the R&I policy-making
mechanism as described in chapter 3.
Having successfully fulfilled its remit, EFFLA ceased to
exist by April 2014. It was fused with the “Innovation for
Growth – i4g” economic expert group and the “European
Research and Innovation Area Board (ERIAB)” into a new
group, the “Research, Innovation, and Science Policy Expert
(RISE)”26 high-level expert group. This new expert group
would advise the Commissioner and DG RTD in cooperation
with the foresight hub on new priorities of science, research
and innovation policy in view of the grand societal challenges.
The grand societal challenges are challenges for foresight
The European research, technology and innovation pro-
gramme Horizon 2020 put much explicit focus on resolving
prospective global and societal problems. There are three
funding areas: academic, industrial, and societal. The area of
grand societal challenges received the greatest share of the
funds. In the early definition of Horizon 2020 by the Member
States, the Swedish Presidency in its Lund Declaration 2009
launched the idea to put central focus on prospective societal
problems instead of on industrial lead technology
programmes.27
The idea was that a challenge-based approach would bring
together resources and knowledge across different fields,
technologies and disciplines, including social sciences and
the humanities. In fact, research activities in Horizon 2020
now bridge research to market with innovation-related activ-
ities, such as piloting.
Horizon 2020 will focus funding on the following societal
challenges:
& Health, demographic change and wellbeing;
& Food security, sustainable agriculture and forestry, marine
and maritime and inland water research, and the bio-
economy;
& Secure, clean and efficient energy;
& Smart, green and integrated transport;
& Climate, environment, resource efficiency and raw
materials;
& Europe in a changing world – inclusive, innovative and
reflective societies;
& Secure societies – protecting freedom and security of
Europe and its citizens.
These challenges mean the following:
“Health, demographic change and wellbeing”. Europe
already spends nearly 10 % of GDP in this field. The aim
is to personalise health and care given the ageing of the





27 Lund Declaration, “Europe Must Focus on the Grand Challenges of
our Time”, Swedish EU Presidency, 8 July 2009, Lund, Sweden, http://
www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.8460!menu/standard/file/lund_
declaration_final_version_9_july.pdf
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sustainability and equity of the European health and care
system which is under increasing threats.
“Food security, sustainable agriculture and forestry, ma-
rine, maritime and inland water and the bio-economy”.
This challenge focuses on making the best of our biolog-
ical resources in a sustainable way. The objective is to
contribute to securing sufficient supplies of safe, healthy
and high quality food and other bio-based products. This
is to be achieved by developing productive, sustainable
and resource-efficient primary production systems, fos-
tering related ecosystem services.
“Secure, clean and efficient energy”. The EU has agreed
on ambitious Energy and Climate targets for 2020 and
beyond to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This is to
increase the share of renewable energies and to improve
energy efficiency. New technologies and solutions need to
compete on cost and reliability with well-established energy
systems technologies. Research and innovation are critical
to make these new, cleaner, low-carbon, efficient energy
sources commercially attractive on the scale needed. They
need to be combined with measures facilitating the market
uptake of these energy technologies and services.
“Smart, green and integrated transport”. The objective
of this societal challenge is to achieve a European trans-
port system that is resource-efficient, climate- and envi-
ronmentally-friendly, safe and seamless. Activities need
to aim at resource efficient transport that respects the
environment including noise and air pollution. Socio-
economic and behavioural research and forward looking
activities for policy making need to support improved
policy making.
“Climate, environment, resource efficiency and raw
materials”. The aim of this societal challenge is to
achieve a resource efficient and resilient economy, the
protection and sustainable management of natural re-
sources and ecosystems. This is in order tomeet the needs
of a growing global population within the sustainable
limits of the planet’s natural resources and eco-systems.
“Europe in a changing world – inclusive, innovative and
reflective societies”. The aim is to gain a greater under-
standing of the societal changes in Europe and their
impact on social cohesion. The development of innova-
tive societies and policies in Europe need to be fostered
through the engagement of citizens, civil society organi-
sations, enterprises and users in research and innovation.
Another objective is to contribute to an understanding of
Europe’s intellectual basis, its history and influences.
“Secure societies – protecting freedom and security of
Europe and its citizens”. This societal challenge aims to
protect European citizens, society and economy as well
as European assets, infrastructures and services, prosper-
ity, political stability and well-being. It aims to eliminate
any malfunction or disruption, either intentional or acci-
dental, that can have detrimental impact with high eco-
nomic or societal costs. The respect of privacy and civil
liberties is the underlying principle.
These seven grand societal challenges are about the future.
The challenges will require high solution potential provided
by technical and socio-economic research, enriched by fore-
sight activities. The application of solutions is however a
political one and less a research or foresight issue. The fore-
sight hub will deal with the assessment of solution potentials
and support institutional and administrative decision making
in DG RTD. These will influence the decisions for funding
allocations and the work programmes for the societal chal-
lenges in Horizon 2020.
Conclusions
The mainstreaming of foresight in DG RTD’s policy making
mechanism signals that foresight has reached some maturity
as a decision support tool for research and innovation policy. It
now has to prove that it can be instrumental with decision
making on practical R&I issues. The proof will be in how far
the next research and innovation work programme has a
greater impact on responding better to society’s needs, and
in how far it can leave some traces in safeguarding European
welfare by research and innovation activities.
Therefore, as foresight research has limits in the real world
of policy decision making and policy development, it is to be
seen if it can keep its position.
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